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Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide an overarching conceptual 
decision model that delineates the major issues and decisions associated with 
carbon regulations that will allow executives to better understand the potential 
regulatory schemes and implications that may be imposed in the near future. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – The authors use the extant literature as the 
foundation to develop a conceptual model of the decisions pertaining to climate 
change regulation that face business executives today. 
 
Findings – This paper suggests four major categories of issues that must be 
addressed in any climate change regulatory scheme. These include: “scope” – 
will carbon emission management systems be global or regional; “who pays” – 
will the consumer or will the supply chain be responsible for the cost of their 
emissions; “market or compliance-based mechanisms” – will the CO2 emissions 
system be market-based or a compliance-based regulatory system; and “criteria” 
– how can credence of the remedy be established – what is necessary for a 
business initiative to qualify for as a creditable carbon offset? 
 
Research limitations/implications – This paper offers a framework that 
categories the fundamental decisions that must be made in any climate change 
regulation. This framework may be useful in advancing research into any of the 
four categories of decisions and their implications on commerce and the 
environment. This paper is designed to be managerially useful and in that way 
does limit its ability to specifically advance many dimensions of research. 
 
Practical implications – The paper offers executives for a simple model of the 
decisions that must be made to craft an effective climate change regulatory 
scheme. In addition, it suggests how these decisions may create exploitable 
economic opportunities for innovative and proactive firms. 
 
Originality/value – This paper adds value to the debate by clarifying the 
decisions that must be addressed in any climate change regulation scheme. 
Keyword(s): 
Climate change; Climate change regulations; Climate change reparation 
scheme; Environmental regulations. 
The controversy regarding the causes and consequences of global warming has 
emerged as one of the most significant global social, political, technological, 
and economic issues facing businesses today; however, there are a wide range 
of views on the importance of climate change. India's Environmental and 
Forests Minister, Jairam Ramesh, even suggested that there is a continuum of 
perceptions concerning the impact of human economic activities on global 
climates including the “climate atheists, the climate agnostics, and the climate 
evangelicals” (Kissel, 2010, p. A17 emphasis added). No matter what camp one 
is in, most firms have recognized that dealing with carbon will impact on 
business activities. While there is no universally accepted perspective of the 
causes or impacts of climate change, there is a growing tide of international 
mandates by the public, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
governmental bodies to reduce CO2 emissions and that these mandates are 
expressed in emerging climate change regulations. This includes international 
treaties such as Kyoto, business-driven initiatives, and the emergence of carbon 
emission management systems such as the EU's emissions trading scheme 
(ETS) (Egenhofer, 2007). Unfortunately, none have achieved their objectives 
due to the complex nature of the global climate eco-system, geo-political 
concerns, and economic pressures. 
Clearly, organizations and households will be impacted by which ever national 
and international climate change regulatory policies are implemented. Like 
other regulatory issues, it will be useful for stakeholders, especially those who 
will bear the costs of addressing environmental degradation, to be proactively 
involved in the development of the regulatory framework (Eberlein and Matten, 
2009; Porter and Reinhardt, 2007). 
The fragile global economic recovery, the “failed” Copenhagen meetings, and 
the “climate-gate” affair in academic journals all have thrown some doubt on 
the “accepted” scientific body of knowledge related to climate change 
(Delingpole, 2009; Dyer et al., 2009). For example, Mathews (2010, p. B4) 
reports that steel makers have “warned that proposed limits on carbon emissions 
and underspending on infrastructure and energy markets could derail the 
industry's nascent recovery.” The net result is a significant loss of political will 
and social momentum toward enacting any meaningful form of climate change 
legislation. 
Regulatory frameworks, such as the EU's ETS, often result in huge financial 
challenges for organizations, but may also create significant economic 
opportunities for enterprising firms as new markets and technologies are created 
to mitigate global carbon emissions (Mathews, 2008). While there has been 
debate and discussion regarding alternative approaches to developing climate 
change regulations, there has been less discussion of the implications of 
alternatives in terms of business action and strategy alternatives. Rather, 
industry warns of a potential “climate change regulation” caused economic 
Armageddon and tends to ignore the economic opportunities that these 
regulations may offer. Informed and explicit engagement by commerce is 
essential for any effective regulatory framework. 
The economic adjustments and potential mandated reductions in carbon 
production are already fuelling the hot winds of a tsunami of entrepreneurial 
destruction that may devastate existing markets and technologies with 
disruptive innovation (Rosen, 2001; Schumpeter, 1934). For better acceptance 
by commerce, entrepreneurial initiatives must be an outcome of any climate 
change regulatory scheme as Barrett (2006, p. 22) suggests: 
An effective climate change treaty must promote the joint supply of two global 
public goods: climate change mitigation and knowledge of new technologies 
that can lower mitigation costs. R&D is especially needed to bring about 
substantial long-term reductions in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse 
gases, for this will require the development and diffusion of revolutionary 
“breakthrough” technologies (Hoffert et al., 2002). 
In some cases, these innovations are a joint activity between government and 
business; for example, the Australian Government has allocated more than 4.5 
billion Australian dollars to: 
[…] support the growth of clean energy generation and new technologies, and 
to reduce carbon emissions and stimulate economic activity in a sector that will 
support thousands of new green-collar jobs (Carr, 2009). 
Other critical economic activities, from livestock production to transportation to 
manufacturing also generate significant quantities of CO2, and therefore should 
also become more engaged in the debate regarding alternative carbon 
regulations (Ekholm et al., 2010). 
The complexity and variation in potential regulatory approaches makes it 
imperative for managers to more fully understand the potential managerial 
implications of alternative carbon emission management systems, if they are 
going to be in a position to shape their development. Climate change regulations 
are inherently complex. Wiener (2001, p. 151 emphases added) notes that: 
Climate change is complex on many dimensions, frustrating simple and hasty 
regulatory responses. The challenge is to design a regulatory system that 
matches these complex realities and thereby accomplishes cost-effective 
advances in global climate protection. At least three kinds of complexity 
confront regulatory design for global climate change: causal complexity, spatial 
complexity, and temporal complexity […] 
More informed executives will be better positioned to proactively craft strategy. 
They will also be better able to influence policy formation rather than being 
forced to reactively respond to impending changes. By engaging in the policy 
formulation process, industry and academia can shape policy alternatives that 
improve the environment and create business opportunities (or possibly 
minimize negative economic impacts). The policy initiatives implemented to 
date have not solved the global problem of climate change, or even, sadly, 
reduced the speed at which environmental harm is accelerating (Botkin et al., 
2007). This paper offers business decision makers a framework that categorizes 
the complexity of issues surrounding climate change regulation into four 
fundamental questions. 
The framework 
Adapted from works by Wiener (2001), Olmstead and Stavins (2006), Farber 
(2007) and Ramseur (2007), four fundamental issues emerge that must be 
addressed in every climate change regulatory scheme. These include: 
RQ1. “Scope” – the “spatial” complexity dimension (Wiener, 2001) – will 
carbon emission management systems be global or regional with each region (or 
nation) adopting their own standards and systems? 
RQ2a. “Who pays” – the “causal” dimension of complexity (Wiener, 2001; 
Olmstead and Stavins, 2006; Farber, 2007) – will the ultimate consumer be 
liable for the paying for the cost of carbon emitted in the supply chain (similar 
to a value added tax), or will each organization within the supply chain be 
responsible for the cost of their own CO2 emissions? 
RQ2b. “Who pays” – the “temporal” dimension of complexity – should the 
developed nations pay for the impact of their long term and historical carbon 
emissions – including some form of climate change reparations scheme, or 
should a redemptive model, forgiving all past sins of emissions, but require all 
to be accountable for emission from the day the regulatory framework is 
enacted? 
RQ3. “Market- or compliance-based mechanisms” (Olmstead and Stavins, 
2006) – will the CO2 emissions system be market-based or a compliance-based 
regulatory system? 
RQ4. The addition of “criteria” – how can credence of the remedy be 
established (Ramseur, 2007) – what is necessary for a business initiative to 
qualify for as a creditable carbon offset? 
Figure 1 shows these fundamental issues. 
The specific regulatory action undertaken regarding each of the above issues 
can have vastly different impact on organizations. This suggests there is a 
strong incentive for commerce to proactively engage policy makers in the 
development of CO2 regulations and standards. While some firms may see 
involvement in framing regulation as an opportunity to immunize themselves 
from excessive and costly mandated oversight (Levine and Forrence, 1990), 
others will take this opportunity to shape the CO2 regulatory framework into a 
system that can be exploited to provide new economic opportunities and 
potentially create a strategic entry barrier exclude less responsive or smaller 
firms from competing (Eberlein and Matten, 2009; Mathews, 2008; Porter and 
Reinhardt, 2007; Rosen, 2001). Entrepreneurial firms will recognize and exploit 
opportunities that arise due to carbon regulations allowing these organizations 
to create new competitive market positions (Barrett, 2006; Nehrt, 1998; Orsato, 
2006). 
Scope and spatial concerns 
Climate is a global and natural system, irrespective of national borders, and 
therefore international in scope; however, there has been debate regarding what 
level of spatial coordination of regulation is most effective and efficient. The 
first major issue is should the carbon emission regulations be managed at the 
local, national, regional, or global level (Wiener, 2001). When considering the 
implications of scope, it is important to consider: 
 geographic domain – national, regional, or global; 
 uniform or compensatory standards (where the standards could differ by 
country); and 
 enforcement authority. 
Global warming as a geo-political problem is being addressed in many ways 
across the world. For example, in 2009 Australia proposed, but failed to pass, 
legislation setting firm carbon targets whereas in 2005 the EU implemented 
regulations utilizing a cap-and-trade style market mechanism to manage carbon 
emissions (Egenhofer, 2007; Shapiro, 2007). Unfortunately, environmental 
systems mandate that an international approach is needed to address the global 
issue. A nationally based patchwork system will mean that there are greater 
opportunities for firms to exploit differences in regulations and engage in free 
riding, while not addressing the problem at the most effective level of 
government. Such problems have already been experienced regarding regulating 
other environmental issues where some firms have shifted facilities to countries 
that have more lax environmental standards (Nehrt, 1998). 
The difference in environmental circumstances within nations and regions 
means that there has been extensive debate as to whether standards should be 
applied equally to all countries (Kissel, 2010). Some leaders, such as India's 
Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh, suggest that, in the name of equity, 
different approaches and standards must be enacted in the actual mechanics of 
how richer and poorer nations address climate change (Kissel, 2010). These 
compensatory standards would exempt some nations from any climate change 
regulation if they could constrain the nation's economic growth. 
The global impact of climate change and the multi-national nature of commerce 
suggest that climate change regulations can be most effective through an 
internationally coordinated policy (Wiener, 2001). Because of the global nature 
of climate systems, carbon emissions from one region will impact climate in 
other regions. This issue is made more complex, as out sourcing of 
manufacturing from developed countries to developing nations shifts the source 
of carbon emissions, reinforcing the perspective that a national or regional 
approach is not viable for addressing carbon management (Chilton, 2000). 
While the Kyoto protocol set up a broad-based international scheme in 1997, it 
allowed each country to design its own unique program, resulting in a 
fragmented set of standards, definitions, and management systems (Barrett, 
2006). These differences have greatly complicated the problem of climate 
change for policy makers, firms, and consumers. Similar to suggestions that ISO 
9000 and 14000 could be adopted as international standards for quality and 
environmental management, it is arguably in the best interests of all parties to 
move towards a consistent global set of standards, definitions, and management 
systems for dealing with carbon emission issues (Miles et al., 1997). 
The causal and temporal dimensions of paying the cost of carbon emissions 
The question of who pays is the second major issue to be determined in any 
climate change regulatory framework (Farber, 2007). There is currently debate 
over which economic actor(s) should take responsibility for carbon emission 
management – governments, consumers, and/or commerce, and at which level 
of the supply chain should the costs of compliance be allocated? For example, 
should emissions be credited to the nation that produces the goods and emits the 
CO2 or to the nation that consumes the goods? There is also a temporal 
dimension to this issue – should developed countries that produced greenhouse 
gases since the industrial revolution pay more of the costs of climate change (a 
climate change reparations scheme) than developing countries that are only now 
increasing their production of greenhouse gases? 
The models of regulating carbon have varying impacts on who should pay. If, 
for example, the ultimate consumer is held responsible for the carbon dioxide 
released to build, transport, consume, and dispose of a good/service that he or 
she purchases, it might require a valued added tax (a CO2 added tax, CO2AT); 
however, a CO2AT scheme in which the “consumer pays” may provide 
manufacturing firms in developing nations with little incentive to reduce their 
carbon emission since the cost is ultimately passed onto the consumer. An 
alternative “emitter pays” scheme may encourage all firms involved throughout 
a supply chain to leverage innovation to ameliorate their respective carbon 
footprints. 
The European Union and Australia favour the “emitter pays” alternative in 
which each firm in the supply chain is held responsible for the carbon that it 
emits; while China (and many other developing nations such as India), favour a 
“consumer pays” CO2AT (Kissel, 2010; Watts, 2009). Regardless of the 
approach, the questions still arises – how can an equitable system be developed 
that will both create incentives to reduce carbon emissions and fairly allocate 
the costs of carbon emissions? 
The question of long-term carbon emitters (the developed nations) being 
required to pay reparations to less-developed nations for the negative 
externalities of past emissions (which still impact the global climate) has the 
potential to cause dramatic international political and cultural conflict. There are 
efficiency, social welfare, social justice, equity, geo-political, and 
implementation concerns with the temporal issue of reparation. 
Implementation mechanism 
The third issue pertains to the type of regulatory system enacted. While there is 
some general agreement that carbon emissions should be reduced, at present 
there is no consensus on whether carbon management should be a compliance-
based regulatory system or a market-based cap-and-trade system. In general, 
transparent and enforced regulatory systems that possess government coercive 
power can result in more immediate emission reductions, but sometimes at a 
high economic cost to the firm and its stakeholders, including lower returns, job 
loss, and diminished tax revenues (Hovi and Holtsmark, 2006). In addition, a 
compliance-based regulatory system is, by nature, a punitive system which 
tends not to create any positive incentives. Libecap (2009) suggests that a 
compliance-based regulatory system is also highly autocratic and the 
implementation might precluded firms from seeking more innovative, 
economical, and effective solutions to meet their emission standards by 
mandating specific pollution abatement technologies, thereby constraining 
innovation, profits, and economic growth. 
In a market-based system, carbon emissions are capped for each firm, and the 
right to emit carbon is transformed into a marketable “property right” by a 
regulatory body that can allocate them (by grant or sale) to economically (or 
politically) significant carbon emitting firms. Excess property rights to emit CO2 
are then traded in a public market that allows more efficient firms to 
economically benefit from their ability to create surplus carbon emission 
“property rights,” while other firms decide that it is more effective to buy 
surplus credits than invest in carbon-reducing innovations (Button, 2008). This 
creates an economic benefit to the carbon credit seller, often reduces the cost of 
compliance for the buyer, and social welfare is no worse off in terms of overall 
carbon production, and potentially better off in terms of economic productivity. 
When the price of surplus carbon credits does not fully reflect all economic and 
environmental costs, there may be little economic incentives for firms to invest 
in carbon emission amelioration technologies and processes. Firms may simply 
purchase carbon permits without any reduction in their own emissions. This 
scenario becomes more likely when a market failure results in an excess supply 
of carbon credits reducing their price to such low levels that it is cheaper to 
simply emit carbon and by carbon credits then it is to invest in emission 
reducing innovations (Andrew, 2008). The creation of positive incentives from 
innovations may be more helpful in allowing firms to gain some form of 
positional advantage, as these organizations identify opportunities for exploiting 
carbon-reducing innovations (Nehrt, 1998). The EU's ETS is based in the 
“emission reduction targets” for each member nation specified under the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol to create these property rights termed carbon emission 
allowances (EUAs) (Bushnell et al., 2009; Engels, 2009). 
The industries that are awarded EUAs include the major emitters of carbon such 
as utilities, steel producers, and pulp and paper mills (European Commission 
Directorate General for Environment, 2005). The EU enforces compliance by 
requiring that each firm in the targeted industries self-report the amount of 
carbon that they emitted that year and balance these emissions with EUAs that 
the firm holds (either from the allocation or purchase of EUAs from others). If a 
firm produces carbon emissions in excess of the EUAs that it holds, it is 
required to purchase additional EUAs or invest “in emission-saving projects in 
third countries” in the form of a “carbon offset credits,” and fined (European 
Communities, 2005). In this way, the EU's system not only stimulates carbon 
emitting firms to improve their efficiency but also creates an entrepreneurial 
opportunity for firms, in the EU, and other countries, to develop carbon saving 
innovations can be sold to firms exceeding their carbon emission targets. The 
EU's ETS has been so successful in managing carbon emissions using economic 
incentives that it has become an attractive model for a global carbon trading 
scheme (Egenhofer, 2007). 
The EU's cap-and-trade system is designed to reduce the EU's overall carbon 
emissions in a cost efficient manner that encourages entrepreneurial initiatives. 
There are suggestions that a global cap-and-trade market-based carbon emission 
regulatory scheme could be developed based on the EU ETS and using 
international certification standards such ISO 14.064 to create a functional 
global market for the trading of carbon credits and positive economic incentives 
for firms globally to create surplus carbon credits through innovation 
(Egenhofer, 2007; Mathews, 2008). A global version of the ETS suggests that a 
firm might simply reduce the amount of carbon it emits by investing in an 
innovative technology or processes, or they may decide that it is more efficient 
to offset the excess carbon they emit by either: 
 purchasing credits from others who have surplus carbon credits; or 
 the purchase of some form of carbon credit or offset from others that are 
generating certified emission reductions (CER) credits. 
In either case, total global emissions of carbon are reduced. 
The criteria for creditable CER 
Measurable avoidance, reduction, or sequestration of carbon dioxide (CO2) or 
other greenhouse gas (GHG) emission. Offsets generally fall within the 
following four categories […] : biological sequestration, renewable energy, 
energy efficiency, and reduction of non-CO2 emissions. To be considered a 
credible offset, the emissions reduced, avoided, or sequestered need to be 
additional to business as usual:, i.e. what would have happened anyway 
(Ramseur, 2007). 
The fourth and final issue of concern with regulation pertains to how can 
creditability be established and insured in climate change regulatory systems? 
To have economic value, these certified CER must meet the following broad 
conditions: 
 Additionality. The reduction in carbon must be in addition to what the 
organization would have done without an economic market for CERs. 
 Permanence. The CER must be a permanent elimination, sequestration, 
or reduction CO2. 
 Uniqueness. CERs may only be counted only once as an offset 
(Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, 2008). 
For example, a forest products company could not sell CERs derived from the 
activity of planting trees in a commercial forest as this activity would be 
considered a normal business activity of a forest products firm and, therefore, 
fail to meet the additionally criteria. In addition, if the trees were “ever” 
harvested, then this activity would also fail to meet the permanence condition, 
as the carbon would be released back into the atmosphere after harvest. 
Likewise, due to the condition of uniqueness both an electric power utility that 
provides highly energy efficient light bulbs to all of its customers and a 
manufacturing plant that is a large customer of that same utility that replaces its 
bulbs with these utility provided high efficiency ones could not claim an offset, 
only one of the parties, either the utility or the manufacturer, could. 
There are potentially more fundamental issues of complexity revolving around 
the issue of the inherent environmental value of alternative carbon offsets and 
savings that must also be considered. A firm can meet its carbon emission 
obligations by either reducing the actual carbon it produces or purchase carbon 
savings from others. In the first instance, there is a real reduction in the carbon 
being produced by organizations; however, in the latter, an organization can 
increase the carbon it produces, but purchase CER “savings” elsewhere through 
the market for carbon offsets, and still be in compliance. Four different types of 
carbon offsets are: 
1. biological sequestration whereby trees or other biological carbon sinks 
are preserved or planted; 
2. renewable energy projects that involve activities that undertake projects 
that produce energy without producing carbon (e.g. solar, wind farms); 
3. energy efficiency which involves improving energy efficiency, 
developing environmentally responsible buildings; or switching/funding 
the switch to long-life light bulbs; and 
4. reduction of non-CO2 emissions from specific sources (e.g. phasing out 
greenhouse gasses) (Ramseur, 2007). 
Recent work has even found that consumers care about how the type of carbon 
offset utilized (MacKerron et al., 2009). There are, of course, other details of 
offsets that should be considered. For example, would the location of the CER 
influence consumer decision making? Consumers may inadvertently assume 
that the firm is investing in CERs located within their local market, which is 
often not the case. The world's climate system is global and high levels of CO2 
generated in one region do impact the climate in other regions. For example, 
tree plantations can be established in New Zealand, or Canada that could be 
used to “offset” CO2 generated during the harvest of the Amazon rainforest but 
without considering the impact on global bio-diversity. In fact, some policy 
makers suggest that these other environmental externalities should not be 
considered in an assessment of carbon offsets (Australian Competition & 
Consumer Commission, 2008), and, thus, the discussion of offsets could 
become very narrowly defined, in regards to the broader environmental debate. 
There are also issues around the temporal dimension of offsets. Some of the 
offsets take many years or decades to occur (in the case of a tree plantation), 
while the carbon emissions may take place at one point in time. The temporal 
and uncertain nature of the savings also means that complicated insurance 
arrangements need to be put in place to ensure that the offset of CO2 actually 
occurs. For example, if the forests (or other biological carbon sinks) planted do 
not live due to harvesting, fire, or disease – then the carbon is not sequestered 
and another offset must be implemented. 
With the development of a burgeoning portfolio of carbon saving industries, 
technologies and auditing/certification services to verify activities, creditability 
concerns have emerged on the part of regulators, NGOs and, corporations, 
regarding potential abuses of exuberant marketers to mislead those in the 
market (Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, 2008; Rosch, 2008). 
In addition, while a range of regulations deal with any potential 
misrepresentation and deception, the complexity associated with offsets means 
that communicating information, whether to organizations or consumers, is ripe 
with potential dangers and there is even scientific debate as to how one 
measures the carbon produced or saved (Millard-Balla and Ortolanob, 2010). 
Some governments have dealt with some of these complexities previously when 
they developed green marketing guidelines, and marketing claims related to 
carbon offsets should fall within the prevue of these regulations and guidelines 
(Weidner and Mez, 2008). 
Implications and conclusions 
There is currently a lack of information and research about the implications of 
carbon offsets on firm and consumer behaviour (Miranda, 2009). Most 
companies generally recognize the need to adapt to changes related to 
environmental issues. These changes are not simply seen as constraints on the 
market, but rather the need to consider how environmental issues can be 
strategically used to achieve market and environmental advantage (Crane, 2000; 
Ginsberg and Bloom, 2004; Miles and Covin, 2000). Given the lack of a 
consistent long-term vision by policy makers regarding the issue of global 
warming, firms have a unique opportunity to provide input to shape regulation. 
This paper has attempted to illustrate the complexity and global nature of the 
nexus of climate change, carbon emissions, and commerce and offers a set of 
four fundamental questions that must be addressed in any climate change 
regulatory system. The paper offers a summary of the implications of various 
carbon emissions management alternatives in Table I. 
The regulatory scope of carbon emissions management systems 
There are clear advantages to executives in having a global carbon management 
system designed to ameliorate climate change: 
 the physical nature of climate; 
 lower cost of global compliance; and 
 the credence of a global system with consistent terms and standards that 
consumers would understand internationally. 
Climate change is a global phenomenon and if human produced CO2 is the 
issue, it does not matter if CO2 is emitted in Stockholm, Sydney, or Singapore; 
it will have the same effect on the world's climate. Additionally, it is much more 
efficient for firms to face one global carbon emission management system, 
eliminating the need to adapt their actions for each specific market that they 
operate within. Fragmented regulatory approaches may also increase consumer 
confusion, as they will possibly not know which set of standards apply. 
The specifics of the system are important for environmental improvements and 
any system needs to be consistent in terms of the requirements placed on firms 
operating in all markets. Fragmented regional and national approaches may also 
result in less responsible firms moving to jurisdictions with lower standards 
(Eskeland and Harrison, 1997). Thus, while they would comply with their new 
relevant national standards, the global carbon emission improvements may be 
negligible, or even negative because of lower standards in the new host 
countries. Should international agreements on developing unified standards fail, 
resulting in multiple standards being implemented, then multi-national firms 
would be better off complying with the highest accepted standard rather than the 
lowest common standard of carbon emissions. While complying with the most 
restrictive national standard is possibly more expensive, this approach of acting 
beyond compliance can enhance a firm's reputation and provide the greatest 
level of brand protection, ultimately lower costs in the long term (Polonsky and 
Jevons, 2009). Additionally, these innovative firms could become leaders in the 
industry by setting global industry standards. 
Determining who should pay 
This is a very complex issue. On one hand, the more costs that can be shifted to 
others in the supply chain, the less this may impact on the perceived price of the 
good to the consumer. The major weakness of this “emitter pays” strategy is the 
concern by policy makers in the developing world that their nations will be 
charged for the carbon emitted in the production of products exported to 
consumers in the developed world. 
Alternatively, a “user pays” CO2AT system shifts costs to end-users (i.e. 
consumers who purchase and use the goods), resulting in price differences 
between goods that exhibit different CO2 emission profiles. This may make a 
CO2AT based “user pays” scheme an effective market mechanism that directs 
consumers towards lower impact consumption alternatives. 
In addition, equity and social justice concerns may require that the temporal 
aspects of allocating the cost of climate change be acknowledged. Nations, such 
as those in the G-8 that have enjoyed the benefits of advanced industrial 
economies have also been emitting increasing amounts of CO2 into the global 
atmosphere since the industrial revolution, and potentially should consider some 
form of climate change reparations scheme where they pay for both their 
historic and current carbon emissions. 
The choice between a market- or regulatory-based scheme 
The question of whether a carbon emission reduction system is market or 
regulatory based has a number of ramifications. If a regulatory system is created 
that mandates the technology is selected, then incremental costs associated with 
carbon abatement will be passed along to consumers resulting in price increases 
for industries that are significant carbon emitters. Alternatively, if a market-
based cap-and-trade scheme is adopted, there is the opportunity for the creation 
of new carbon abatement technologies that result in positive economic 
externalities. For example, in the EU's ETS there is an economic imperative to 
reduce carbon emissions through entrepreneurial initiatives and technologies 
that reduce carbon emission throughout the entire supply chain. 
Credence and CERs 
There is an assumption that for markets to operate then general information 
must be free and costless. In regards to carbon and climate change, while the 
information is possibly freely available, explaining the complex meaning of 
various carbon management schemes to consumers is potentially problematic 
(Polonsky et al., 2002). For example, in a recent study of 361 consumers, it was 
found that while 71.8 percent could pass a factual test on general environmental 
issues (five out of eight questions correct), the majority of the same sample 
failed miserably on a similar test about carbon offsets. In addition, subjects 
having a high level of general environmental knowledge were less 
knowledgeable about carbon and climate change issues (Polonsky et al., 2009). 
Thus, the question of how firms communicate this complex environmental 
information about carbon emissions to consumers, whether they are final 
consumers evaluating firms or industrial organizations, is much less clear. One 
approach is through the use of global certification schemes or labels, but at 
present there are a multitude of alternative certification schemes for carbon 
offsets and no one scheme is necessarily universally more accepted than any 
other (Kollmuss et al., 2008). 
How can consumers be expected to evaluate such complex carbon information? 
Some aspects of this information appear to matter to consumers (MacKerron et 
al., 2009). The issues of additionally, permanence, and uniqueness suggest that 
without a standardized system of international regulation consumer confusion 
may condemn any system to failure. The competition between emission 
schemes means variances in these emission control systems will make their 
assessment by consumers more difficult. Some managers unfortunately will see 
this as an opportunity to “spin” any corporate action into an environmental and 
carbon reduction benefit through “green washing.” This potential for 
miscommunication resulted in the early failures in green marketing, and without 
some consistent globally recognized meaning, may occur with the 
communication of CERs (Mohr et al., 1998). 
By addressing the implications of these issues on organizational strategy, 
academics and managers will be able to ensure that organizations are able to 
respond to regulation as it is developed, as well as to participate in the 
discussions thus shaping regulation that creates sustainable environmental and 
business outcomes. 
 
Figure 1The four questions of climate change regulations and implications 
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